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Greenwashed sports and environmental activism: Formula 1 and FIFA 
 
Two of the most globally popular sports events, Formula 1 motor racing and the Men’s World 
Cup of football, are directly and indirectly environmentally destructive. They serve as 
advertisements for heavy industry, are designed for elite as much as mass consumption, 
and provide sponsors with dubious social licenses to operate. This occurs through the very 
mechanisms of the events themselves (engines in Formula 1, tourists in the World Cup). 
I have selected those two sites for three reasons. First, because they appear at ﬁrst 
blush to be so different from one another: international elite motor racing automatically 
elicits critique of its class and ecological indexicality and impact, while football is 
associated with a more populist, accessible culture. Second, because despite those 
distinctions, both Formula 1 and global football have drawn the ire of a similarly 
transnational actor, in the form of Greenpeace, attracted by their shared association with 
its sworn enemies, oil companies drilling in the Arctic. And third, because the environ- 
mental issues that these competitions pose have eluded substantive critique and 
successful activism. I look at the greenwashing claims made about Formula 1 and football 
and examine attempts by Greenpeace to problematize them, juxtaposed with ways in 
which environmental activism might operate via counter-discourses of economic and 
ecological citizenship. I suggest that a progressive agenda can be forwarded by vanguard 
organizations working with their fellow elites in motor sport. In the case of football, the 
lead should come from grassroots fans rather than the usual 
third-sector suspects of Big Green (http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title = ig_Green). 
Along with many other things, both Formula 1 and the Men’s World Cup are sites 
where participants and sponsors seek social licenses to operate. This surprisingly overt 
term has been adopted with relish by extractive polluters to explain their plans for winning 
local, national, and international communities’ approval of exploration and mining (Klein, 
2012; Prno & Slocombe, 2012; Nelsen, 2006; Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). The 
International Energy Agency numbers social licenses to operate among its ominously titled 
Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas (2012). Apart from offering such direct beneﬁts to 
communities as energy and employment, companies seek to buttress their 
searches for social licenses to operate via art and sport. 
The global oil and gas company, BP, has powerful, enduring relationships with some of 
Britain’s principal cultural institutions, including the National Gallery, the National Maritime 
Museum, Tate Britain, the Natural History Museum, the Science Museum, and the National 
Gallery. Blockbuster shows sponsored by environmental miscreants work both ways. They 
give alibis to the arts by countering populist claims that only elite segments of society visit 
such places, and they associate quality and populism alike with big oil. 
Sport offers an even more direct hold on the popular imagination. The 255 public, 
private, and mixed projects of international development listed as utilizing sport in 2008 
represented a 93% increase over ﬁve  years.  A high proportion  involved  corporations,  
frequently  via  “Astroturf” ( faux grassroots) organizations. Sport can make corporations 
resemble governing agencies operating with the public good in mind, even as their actions 
frequently heighten north–south imbalances, pro- mote their own wares, commodify sports, 
distract attention from corporate malfeasance in terms of the environment and labor, and 
stress international/imperial sports over local ones (Levermore, 2010; Silk, Andrews, & 
Cole, 2005): a classic case of a social license to operate. 
Formula 1 directly incarnates Big Oil’s search for a social license, because it embodies 
both the glamorous sphere of high performance and the quotidian necessity of transport. 
For its part, football accretes extractive sponsors who wish to beneﬁt from its auratic blend 
of excitement and everyday life. So, BP’s carbon management division (which is described 
as not-for-proﬁt) cut a deal with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
 (FIFA) for the 2014 World Cup whereby ticket holders could register to have their carbon 
bootprint offset—with the prospect of two registrants winning tickets to the Final 
(https://www.bptargetneutral.com/uk/2014/04/1690/). Hence, the symbolic signiﬁcance of 
these events for environmentalists seeking to disrupt business as usual—emphasizing their 
own social license to operate through activism against such greenwashing. 
Formula 1 is a complex ﬁeld for critical scholars of the environment. Its chrome cars are 
coeval stars with the brash boys who ride them. The sport’s advanced engineering seeks 
ever-greater fuel efﬁciency, which is in turn passed on to everyday business and domestic 
motoring, supposedly diminishing the latter’s carbon footprints (King, 2013; Sam, 2012; 
Scott, 2013). 
For its part, football, easily the world’s most popular sport in terms of playing and 
watching, appears on the surface to be among the least ecologically malevolent of 
pastimes: it requires a   ball, a ﬁeld, and physical play, as opposed to engines, roads, and 
carbon-fueled speed. But when we take into account where the equipment is made and 
transported for use, the water and chemicals involved in ground maintenance, the food 
consumed at games, the use of electricity in powering, covering, and watching, and the 
impact of travel and tourism for major events such as the Men’s World Cup, the story looks 
remarkably different (Malhado & Rothfuss, 2013). 
Whilst not proposing that Formula 1 is angelic and the World Cup demonic, the basic 
paradoxes identiﬁed above necessitate that environmentalists inspect such circumstances 
with some care. Neither event has seen signiﬁcant activism, apart from secondary boycott-
style attempts to interrupt the link between them and polluting sponsors. Greenpeace, a 
rightly well-regarded and in many ways effective campaign organization, has tried to disrupt 
fans’ views and enjoyment of Formula 1 (the Brussels Grand Prix) and football (the 
Champions’ League) to push for secondary boycotts against Shell and Gazprom, extractive 
corporations that seek social licenses to operate via sponsorship of these competitions 
(Cohen, 2014a, 2014b; Cooper, 2013; Naidoo, 2013). 
In addition to examining arguments for and against the green claims that these events 
make, I am also concerned to evaluate the utility of counter-discourses that are meant to 
raise awareness (this used to be called “consciousness”) among  both fans  and  the wider  
public through     spectacular disruption. I conclude that the efforts of Greenpeace to appear 
as a grassroots organization combating Big Sports may be misguided. It might do better to 
recognize the reality that Formula 1 and Greenpeace are fellow multinational organizations 
with huge bureaucracies, then draw on that con- sanguinity to call for change (Sam, 2013). 
In the case of football, it might be advised to allow the lead to be taken by others and accept 
a follower’s role, undertaking relevant research and encouraging grassroots fan activism. 
Formula 1 
Most sports are about individuals or teams, but rarely both. Most sports involve the use of 
technology, but rarely in ways that give equal prominence and rewards to each. Most sports 
involve degradation of the environment, but rarely as an overt component of their very 
essence. Yet, along with its hyper- masculine First World class base and industrial 
showmanship, Formula 1 motor racing combines all these factors (Pﬂugfelder, 2009). It is 
an unusual business—and a very big one. 
The sport’s 2012 prospectus disclosed 2011 revenue of US$1.5 billion and operating 
proﬁt of US 
$451 million, while 2013 analyses suggested annual income growth of 9% through 2016, 
much of it because sponsors like the fact that its events are global and its season eternal: 
Formula 1 is akin to an Olympics or a World Cup where the key events occur annually, year 
round, and across the world, rather than every four years, for a month, and in one region 
(Blitz, 2013). It is a perfect example of world capitalism physically transcending space and 
time in ways that elude other sports, which tend to be constrained by seasons and zones. 
Not surprisingly, the cost of holding a Formula 1 Grand Prix is vast. For example, the 
annual bud- get of the Australian event is reportedly A$30 million, compounded at 15% a 
 year. Much of that ﬁgure is met with public funds; hence the need for triple bottom-line 
analysis that looks at the   costs and beneﬁts of such occasions in economic, social, and 
environmental terms (Fairley, Tyler, Kellett, & D’Elia, 2011). 
Again and again, studies of the economic impact of relocating sports teams, subsidizing 
stadia, attracting international events, and the like have shown the spuriousness of public 
subsidies for such enterprises (Nunn & Rosentraub, 2003). In the Australian case, 
Economists at Large (under- taking the splendidly entitled analysis, “Priconomics”) have 
shown that the 2012 Grand Prix generated a loss to the state of Victoria of A$60.6 million 
(http://www.ecolarge.com/blog/grand- priconomics-2013/; Campbell, 2013). This is apart 
from the impact  on  birdlife,  waterways,  trees, noise, trash, carbon footprints, and public 
utilization of the venue in Albert Park (Fairley      et al., 2011). 
Yet, states persist in sporting subvention, and even sacriﬁce their own authority as part 
of the pro- cess. A Grands Prix Act exempts the Melbourne event from otherwise mandatory 
environmental protection (Fairley et al., 2011) and the bourgeois media and State and 
Federal governments largely ignore evidence that runs counter to the boosterism that 
characterizes the affair and distorts its popularity (Australian Press Council, 2012; Crook, 
2011). 
The Save Albert Park grassroots group has produced kits on legal, economic, 
environmental, and trafﬁc implications and has a regular radio show (http://save-albert-
park.org.au/sapweb/kits.html; http://tunein.com/radio/Save-Albert-Park-p571571/). But its 
efforts draw diminishing concern because of bipartisan political support for the event 
(Green, 2014). 
Beyond Australia, potentially positive externalities deriving from Formula 1 lead the way 
in state and media discourses alike. While acknowledging setbacks to green momentum 
caused by the global ﬁnancial crisis, “Lord” Drayson (2010), Britain’s former Minister for 
Science and Technology and a lapsed race-car driver and proprietor, told the grandly 
named European Cleaner Racing Conference that “motorsport can become an even 
greater national asset as we move to a low-carbon economy” by developing 
environmentally sound technologies that can be sold to commercial and customer 
automotive interests. Conventional press reporting leads with the same message (Elliott, 
2014; Scott,  2013) even arguing  that “Cyclists are  miles behind  Formula  1 in the 
environmental   race” 
due to the massive impact of travel on events such as the Tour de France, weighed against 
the “cut- ting-edge technology” that saw Formula 1 vehicles use a third of the fuel in 2014 
compared to the previous year with no loss in performance (Pickford, 2014). 
The sport’s overall governing body is the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile 
(FIA). But Formula 1 is a private, corporate endeavor and has signiﬁcant autonomy. FIA 
support for greener technology cannot be mandated to cover Formula 1 and is frequently 
pooh-poohed by participants in its richest and most prestigious competition. Formula 1 
bosses are horriﬁed, for example, by emis- sion changes that have reduced the noise 
pollution of its macho toys (Blitz, 2013; Pearce, 2009; Spur- geon, 2014). 
Greenpeace, a key multinational environmental activist bureaucracy with the scale 
necessary to coordinate campaigns in a way that is equal if not superior to its opponents, 
has endeavored to dis- rupt Grand Prix events through a now-familiar tactic: people 
dressing up in bright colors and climb- ing onto things that are owned by others. Such 
practices are neither contra the sport itself nor focused on its environmental record. Rather, 
they represent a kind of secondary boycott strategy directed at particular event sponsors, 
notably Shell, as part of a campaign to stem drilling for oil    in the Arctic (Naidoo, 2013; 
Sam, 2013). 
Greenpeace has had recent success with a secondary boycott, persuading Lego not to 
renew its product-placement deal with Shell in 2014 through the deployment of well-drilled 
child activists and expensive video art. A smart, sophisticated, and well-heeled 
multinational marketing campaign drew on the services of advertising agencies, 
appropriated trademarks, and copyrights and was further enabled via a vast network 
 (Miller, 2014). Unlike Greenpeace’s failed interventions into sport, the campaign did not 
feature vanguardists craving TV coverage through perilous   pranks. 
There is no evidence of success in removing sponsors or changing attitudes among 
motorsport fans as a consequence of these latter, overly familiar, forms of direct action. 
Ironically, it seems that Formula 1’s corporate sponsors have been more effective 
advocates for a green agenda than Greenpeace or spectators (Black, 2010; Allen, 2013, 
2014). This is because corporations are well schooled in taking what they call asymmetrical 
actions against smaller but still sizeable critics. Extractive companies base their strategies 
on successful struggles by regular armies against guerrilla forces. Such activism may irritate 
but rarely deters them (Marshall, Telofski, Ojiako, & Chipulu, 2012). They select parts of 
the critique they can implement at minimal cost then move   on. 
It is telling that Greenpeace insists on secrecy in its direct actions, despite its faith in 
spectacle and calls for others to be transparent in their dealings, and boasts of marketing 
experts who teach it how to engage in effective branding even as it attacks public-relations 
discourse. There is at least a para- dox here. Similarly, the organization entered a 
competition to design green strategies for the 2000 summer Olympics for adoption by the 
host committee. Its participation featured in the Australian governments’ bid, with 
Greenpeace representatives traveling from Australia to Monaco to extoll the virtues of a 
Sydney-based Games on the grounds that sports were ideal sites for propelling a green 
agenda into the public sphere. It stayed studiously away from the most pressing 
environmental issue of such events—travel—and avoided upsetting most sponsors 
(including world-leading eco-mis- creants such as UPS, Coca Cola, Kodak, and 
McDonalds) while endorsing the use of reclaimed pol- luted sites for the Olympics and the 
prospects for minimizing ecological damage to the region, despite its longstanding 
opposition to toxic dumping1 (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002). This love of  the darkness and 
subterfuge, blended with a frottage with corporate expertise, reads remarkably like 
clandestine Australian governmental consultation with companies over Grand Prix 
decisions and actions (Cohen, 2014b; Lowes, 2004). It is not a good look for civil society. 
Moving away from secrecy would be more in keeping with the Quaker religious sources of 
the organization’s ethos (Wapner, 1995). 
Beyond these ethical missteps, the failure to generate change suggests that there may 
be greater utility for Greenpeace in using its multinational power and bureaucracy to 
negotiate with Formula 1 and associated sponsors, rather than alienating fans who show 
little appreciation of the undoubted importance of its message. 
 
World Cup 
Staging a World Cup is also massively expensive. Brazil budgeted US$31 billion for the 2014 
Finals, though this included construction projects for the 2016 summer Olympics as well. 
FIFA claims the actual cost of hosting (which it calculates as the price for creating “temporary 
infrastructure”) was US 
$600 million, while the Association itself spent US$1.7 billion and proﬁted by US$2.7 billion 
(War- shaw, 2014). 
Like the FIA and Formula 1, FIFA routinely sidesteps sovereignty over space and people 
(Bond, 2010; Hyde, 2010)—consider the way it transcended the European Union to broker 
power-sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cooley & Mujanović, 2014). But the Association does 
have a more progressive environmental policy than Formula 1: 
Issues such as global warming, environmental conservation and sustainable 
management are a concern for   FIFA, not only in regards to FIFA World Cups™, 
but also in relation to FIFA as an organisation. That is         why FIFA has been 
engaging with its stakeholders and other institutions to ﬁnd sensible ways of 
addressing environmental issues and mitigate the negative environmental impacts 
linked to its activities. (FIFA, 2012) 
 From solar-powered stadia to free public transportation, the 2006 World Cup featured a 
“Green Goal,” which claimed to make the event “climate-neutral” by saving 100,000 tons of 
carbon dioxide through offset projects in India and South Africa and minimizing transport, 
energy, water, and refuse (Collins, Jones, & Munday, 2009; Mitchell, 2007). But the data 
excluded international tra- vel—a crucial difference between environmental audits that 
focus on one country but do not con- sider wider ecological impacts. This has led to 
accusations of greenwashing (Collins et al., 2009). 
Because the claims made for the 2006 tournament rang hollow, FIFA set up an 
Environmental Forum. Its task was to “green” stadia, training grounds, accommodation, 
amenities, and so on, in accordance with the UN Environmental Program’s Global Forum 
for Sports and the Environment (Collins et al., 2009). For the 2010 tournament, South Africa 
used biogas from landﬁlls, power from wind farms, and efﬁcient lighting. The local organizers 
proudly proclaimed that nine teams had their jerseys made from recycled polyethylene 
terephthalate bottles. Coincidentally, these nations were themselves sponsored by a major 
sporting goods company, which remorselessly promoted its   good deed (Climate Neutral 
Network, n. d.). 
But South Africa has one of the worst records in the world in its neglect of alternative 
energy. Because of poor internal transportation infrastructure and a dependence on coal-
ﬁred power, a mas- sive carbon footprint from an inﬂux of tourists was inevitable. Before the 
2010 World Cup, the South African and Norwegian governments conducted a study of its 
likely environmental impact. They came up with these ﬁgures: 
 
Component Emissions (tCO2e) Share 
International transport 1,856,589 67.4 Inter-city transport 484,96
1 
17.6 
Intra-city transport 39,577 1.4 
Stadia constructions and  materials 15,359 0.6 
Stadia and precinct energy use 16,637 0.5 
Energy use in accommodation 340,12
8 
12.4 
Total excluding international 
transport 
896,66
1  Total including international 2,753,250 100 




The South African Government generated tender documents inviting competition to 
offset the environmental impact of World Cup travel, but issued no contracts. Mostly fueled 
by European tour- ism, the 2010 Finals had the largest carbon footprint of any commercial 
event in world history, twice that of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In the absence of high-speed 
rail and adequate existing stadia, 850,000 tons of carbon were expended, 65% through 
construction and ﬂying (there were some improvements to municipal mass transit). Claims 
that corporate efforts to green things encouraged fans to act similarly remain unproven.  
Green Goal sought to inspire additional  environmental 
initiatives across time and across the country, but neither efﬁcacy nor proliferation has been 
satis- factorily demonstrated (Bond, 2010; Climate Neutral Network, n. d.; Cornelissen, 
Urmilla, & Swart, 2011; Cartwright, 2010; Death, 2011; Mol, 2010; Shachtman, 2010). 
In addition, the drain on power sources in other countries broadcasting the Cup is huge—
the Car- bon Trust has shown that people watching football via mobile-data phone 
connections multiply their footprint 10-fold in comparison with television or WiFi viewing, for 
example (http://www.carbon- trust.com/media/360767/carbon-bootprint-infographic.pdf). 
But this gluttony is rarely acknowl- edged other than as self-promotion: the UK’s National 
Grid highlights its management of peak electricity usage based on audience activity during 
half time in Finals matches, when people race to the kettle and porcelain. Power use surges 
by as much as 10% in what is known as the “TV pick-up” (National Grid, 2010). 
The 2014 tournament in Brazil was supposed to be played in green stadia—a veritable 
Copa Verde. The green claims repeated the subterfuge of 2010 in sidestepping the 
international and internal transportation of over three and a half million tourists, which 
 amounted to 84% of emissions associated with the Finals. And misuse of public money on 
unsustainable construction projects led to mass protests (Estrada, 2010; Spanne, 2014). 
As in the South African case, positive externalities of reputation, tourism, and foreign 
currency outweighed such concerns in the eyes of the state, capital, and the bourgeois 
media. 
Attempts by Greenpeace to problematize Big Football’s impact on the environment have 
largely foundered. Again, they have targeted secondary entities rather than bringing the 
event’s very exist- ence, or at least its management, into question. Sponsors are prioritized 
in Greenpeace’s activities, and at the cost of fans’ enjoyment of matches. When it sought 
to interrupt the Champions’ League Final of 2014 by protesting against Gazprom, an 
extractive sponsor, the ruse was quickly uncovered and managed (and said nothing about 
the unsustainability of the event itself). In defensive mode, Greenpeace used 
embarrassingly corporate language to say that it had “total domination in the sphere of 
delivery” (Cohen, 2014a). Prolix capitalist machismo lives; but that suggested, as per the 
Formula 1 protests and the use of advertising agencies, how close the organization’s 
vocabulary and strategy are to its apparent adversaries, and how distant from football 
fans—some of whom have radical ideas. 
Citizenship 
In the light of Greenpeace’s tendentious secondary boycott strategies and the failure of 
states to con- trol the self-legislating, arrogant entities that are Formula 1 and FIFA, how 
might citizens respond to the environmental challenges posed by the activities of Big 
Motoring and Big Football? 
The last 200 years of modernity have seen the expansion of citizenship—theoretically, 
geographi- cally, and demographically. It occupies three zones, with partially overlapping 
and partially distinct historicities. These spheres are the political (conferring the right to 
reside and vote), the economic (the right to work and prosper), and the cultural (the right 
to know and speak). They correspond    to the French Revolutionary cry of liberté, égalité, 
fraternité [liberty, equality, solidarity] and the Argentine left’s contemporary versión: ser 
ciudadano, tener trabajo, y ser alfabetizado [citizenship, employment, literacy] (Martín-
Barbero, 2001, p. 9). The ﬁrst category concerns political rights; the second, material 
interests; and the third, cultural representation (Miller, 2007). Each one has nor- mally 
operated within national jurisdictions. 
In the contemporary world, citizenship is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to describe without 
reference to its seeming antinomy of consumption. Citizens and consumers shadow each 
other—national sub- jects versus rational ones, altruists versus monads. Under 
neoliberalism, politics has become artiﬁcial and consumption natural, a better means of 
legitimizing social arrangements. Adopting the tenets of consumers, citizens are desirous, 
self-actualizing subjects who conform to general patterns of con- trolled behavior. Adopting 
the tenets of citizens, consumers are self-limiting, self-controlling subjects 
who conform to general patterns of purchasing behavior. Sometimes, both sides fail to 
see what is “good” for them (as when citizens resist ﬁnancial globalization, or consumers 
borrow ill-advisedly). In ecological and democratic terms, such beliefs lead to plutocratic 
arrangements—for example, if green activism is ordered around consumption, those who 
do not consume, or barely do so, are ipso facto excluded from the exercise of power in the 
same way as they are marginal to decisions made by the International Monetary Fund or 
the World Bank, where voting is decided by ﬁnancial contri- bution. And ontologically, 
we must reject the timeless, spaceless, monadic selﬁshness envisioned in bourgeois 
social science (Hardin, 1968). The evidence does not support its conceits of corporate 
beneﬁcence and consumer selﬂessness as solutions to environmental despoliation 
(Humphreys, 2009; Seyfang, 2005). But it would be unwise to turn our backs completely 
on the current hegemony of economic citizenship and reject all forms of plutocracy. The 
conjuncture will not permit such 
comforting purity. 
 Beginning in the 1970s, there was a change in economic citizenship away from the 
welfare of the public and toward the welfare of the private in ways that inﬂect and infect 
citizenship tout court. In addition to fundamental policy decisions that redistributed wealth 
upwards and internationally, this radical change had an ideological dimension—
neoliberalism. One of the most successful projects to reshape individuals in human history, 
neoliberalism’s achievements rank alongside such productive and destructive sectarian 
practices as state socialism, colonialism, nationalism, and religion. Its lust for market 
regulation over democratic regulation is so powerful that true-believing prelates opine on 
every topic imaginable, from birth rates to divorce, suicide to abortion, and performance-
enhancing drugs to altruism. Rhetorically, neoliberal economic citizenship stands against 
elitism (for popu- lism); against subvention (for markets); against politicians (for activists); 
and against public servants (for philanthropists) (Grantham & Miller, 2010). 
It comes as no surprise that when the Trinity was being ideologized within Christianity, 
some- thing had to be done to legitimize the concept at the same time as dismissing and 
decrying polytheistic and pagan rivals to the new religion’s moralistic monotheism. Hence 
oikonomia, a sphere of worldly arrangements that was to be directed by a physical presence 
on Earth representing theology’s prin- cipal superstition, the deity. God gave Christ “the 
economy” to manage, so “the economy” indexically manifested Christianity (Agamben, 
2009). 
In keeping with neoliberalism’s crass class project, economic citizenship has changed 
dramatically from social welfare to corporate welfare. Begging/demanding ﬁrms are handed 
taxpayers’ money while individuals and social groups are told to fend for themselves. In 
direct contradiction to doc- trines of equality and social justice, this is socialism for 
capitalists and capitalism for workers. The most powerful of the three conventional 
citizenship discourses, it adds to the burden of environ- mental costs, because its growth 
ethic is “hollowed out by a misguided vision of unbounded consu- mer freedoms” (Jackson, 
2009, p. 5). Environmental disasters are instances of negative economic externalities 
whose costs that are not borne by the companies and governments that create them. This 
is especially true when the damage is transnational (Rosen & Sellers, 1999, pp. 585–586). 
The social license to operate is a classic invocation of economic citizenship that seeks 
to elude state regulation by appealing to the material or affective interests of communities 
through a compli- cated mélange of consumerist self-interest and civic pride. This is 
especially troublesome because the national boundaries and interests that typically deﬁne 
and engage citizens are brought into question by the border-crossing impact of 
environmental despoliation (Dean, 2001)—and sporting agencies and bodies frequently 
transcend physical and legislative borders. 
More than an addition to the rights and responsibilities of territorially based citizenship, 
green citizenship is a critique of them, a corrective that seeks to save nature, infrastructure, 
and heritage from capitalist growth. Bypassing localism and contemporaneity to address 
universal and future obligations, it transcends conventional political–economic space and 
time, extending rights beyond the hic et nunc in search of a globally sustainable ecology. 
Green citizenship looks centuries ahead, refusing to discount the health and value of future 
generations, and opposing elemental risks that are created by capitalist growth in the 
present (Dobson, 2003). Its concerns touch on the very essence of political activity. Bruno 
Latour explains: 
From the time the term politics was invented, every type of politics has been deﬁned 
by its relation to nature, whose every feature, property, and function depends on the 
polemical will to limit, reform, establish, short-cir- cuit, or enlighten public life. (2004, 
p. 1) 
Environmental citizenship necessitates allocating equal and semi-autonomous signiﬁcance 
to natural phenomena, social forces, and cultural meaning. Just as objects of scientiﬁc 
knowledge come to us in hybrid forms that are coevally subject to social power and textual 
meaning, so the latter two domains are themselves affected by the natural world (Latour, 
 1993, pp. 5–6). 
Social movements invoke citizenship imperatives against consumerist ones when they 
claim pub- lic rights to clean air, soil, and water that supersede the private needs of industry, 
identify a respon- sibility for the environment that transcends national boundaries and state 
interests, and espouse intergenerational care rather than discounting future generations in 
favor of ephemeral   needs. 
Because environmental issues transcend state boundaries, short-term priorities, and 
commercial rents, they must be managed by international organizations, both 
governmental and not. This is neither new nor entirely dissociated from national citizenship. 
Away from the utopic hopes of world government on a grand scale, international 
organizations have been working for a very    long time, sometimes quietly and sometimes 
noisily, to manage particular issues. Seafaring, telecom- munications, occupational 
accreditation, Catholicism, and postage all come to mind. Their business is sometimes 
conducted at a state level, sometimes through civil society, and sometimes via both. In 
almost every case, they encounter or create legal and political instruments that make them 
accoun- table to the popular will of sovereign states, at least in name. 
Environmentalism may be overdetermined or co-opted via technocratic mandarinism or 
corpor- ate shill, but it remains a key site of change, generally via representative 
government. This has hap- pened for both good and ill in debates over everything from bald 
eagles to building codes. Even the most neoliberally misinformed trade agreements 
generally provide for the ultimate political excep- tion to laissez-faire exchange between 
borders—namely, standing armies as entities of the sovereign state—and may exempt 
environmental matters as well. 
As green governance introduces aspirations into the global public sphere that counter 
the environmental despoliation threatening human life, it also confronts risks to nonhuman 
nature posed by the mounting ecological crisis. This allows mainstream environmentalism 
to embrace diverse environmental politics—from left eco-centrism and eco-feminism to 
technocratic, anthropo- centric forms that privilege human interests (Swanton, 2010, p. 
146). 
These schools differ over values (which entities qualify for moral consideration and which 
matter most), rights (the protection of individual and collective entities), and consequences 
(responsibility for actions and motives that affect collective well-being). For anthropocentric 
eco-ethics, nonhuman nature has no moral standing (and hence no rights) other than in 
relation to how people are affected by changes in nature. Eco-centric ethics, by contrast, 
holds that “some or all natural beings, in the broadest sense, have independent moral 
status” (Curry, 2006, p. 64). Intermediate ecological ethics accords intrinsic value to 
nonhuman nature, albeit not as completely as eco-centrism, though it agrees that moral 
status can be extended to other sentient   beings. 
Anthropocentric eco-ethics dominates mainstream environmentalism and much state 
and pop- ular discourse. It both endorses and attacks consumption, urging green citizens 
to buy responsibly and recycle. Its gendered notion of virtue favors a hegemonic masculinity 
of self-reliance, embodies a neoliberal focus on individual responsibility rather than 
collective and state-based action, and rejects participatory, deliberative democracy in favor 
of a moralistic and plutocratic republicanism (Arias-Maldonado, 2007; Barry, 2006; Latta, 
2007; MacGregor, 2006). In a stronger model, Anne Schwenkenbecher argues that 
“citizens of states which have the power to achieve an efﬁcient climate regime” should 
comply “with the moral duties they have as inhabitants of high emission countries,” not least 
due to the political power available within democracies (2014, p. 183). 
 
It is clear that national and international organizations and accords have not put a stop 
to environmental destructiveness (Beck & Grande, 2010, p. 410). While Greenpeace 
makes concerted attempts to follow the precepts of green citizenship, Formula 1 and FIFA 
exemplify transnational actors operating with relative autonomy from states and with an 
abiding taste for greenwashing. Cor- porations such as these routinely describe themselves 
 as citizens but principally pursue economic interests. Their restless quest for proﬁt 
unfettered by regulation is twinned with a desire for moral legitimacy and free advertising 
that is based on “doing right” in a very public way while growing rich in a very private one. 
They claim respect for the law and illustrate the desire to meddle in others’ lives: 
greenwashing via moralism. Social licenses to operate embody this rhetoric. 
FIFA and Formula 1’s shared growth evangelism makes them part of our environmental 
problem in three ways: as polluters, greenwashers, and licensees. These bodies arrogate to 
themselves the right to make and break laws, to buy and sell territories, and to pollute the 
world. We should not be in thrall to this self-anointed elect’s control of sport, especially when 
it is deeply connected to commer- cial dictates and surveillance. What can green citizens 
do? What might be a way forward for environ- mental activism engaging Formula 1 and 
FIFA? 
Parts of Latin America have seen successful mobilization in the recent past of citizenship 
rights for ragpickers, denizens of the informal economy who remove and recycle waste. In 
2009, Colom- bia’s Constitutional Court ruled that they were entrepreneurs. That decision 
formalized their status, decriminalized their activities, protected their livelihood from shifts 
in state policy that had shut down dumps, and offered them the chance to tender for waste-
management concessions from   local government. Cali-based ragpickers were pioneers 
in establishing cooperatives, and held the world’s ﬁrst global conference of their colleagues 
in 2008. Along the way, they worked closely with highly educated progressives, notably 
lawyers and public-health advocates who were able to translate across popular and elite 
discourses (Maxwell & Miller, 2012). 
The Colombian example opens up questions of scale and citizenship. Top-down ties are 
required in the case of vast entities such as the ones I have focused on here. There are 
several standard ways of regulating multinational corporations and the trans-territorial 
challenges they pose for citizen action: “soft law [protocols of international organizations], 
hard law [nationally based legislation], codes of conduct [transnational norms] and 
voluntary self-regulation.” The process is imperfect: these strat- egies have not always 
secured a nexus between “the transfer of technology” and the transfer of “prac- tices for 
using it safely” (Baram, 2009, p. 756). And their agendas must come about in consultation 
with the popular classes, scientiﬁc and legal counsel, and transnational as well as local 
perspectives in addition to traditional elites. 
Decentralized, participatory governance can play a vital role in policy-making by involving 
com- munity members, resource users, experts, and elites (Karpowitz, Raphael, & 
Hammond, 2009, 
p. 584). Well-organized local institutions have greater success in managing resources when 
external laws provide for their autonomy (involving users in their choice of regulations so 
that these are per- ceived to be legitimate) and political–economic arrangements 
encourage organizational relation- ships between enterprises and communities that share 
ecosystems, monitoring what works and what does not, modifying methods of resource 
acquisition, eliminating harmful waste, and sharing information (Ostrom, 2000, p. 47). Such 
models transcend the neoliberal policy framework that has dominated the ideology of 
growth for three decades, recognizing instead that rational outcomes may derive from 
stakeholder approaches to managing the commons (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002). 
That implicates activists in mainstream approaches. The stereotypical vanguardist taste 
for out- sider status as pranksters who transgress the norms of institutions that represent 
the electoral public or ﬁnancial shareholders can make them abjure such incorporation. But 
Greenpeace has shown that it can transcend that Angst in its sophisticated scientiﬁc 
research and policy proposals on such issues as electronic waste and sporting apparel, 
which have been more effective than its secondary-boycott sporting activities (Greenpeace, 
2012, 2014). 
The Colombian ragpickers represent a fascinating exemplar of the transformation of 
political sub- jects from  social  problems  to  social  boons:  they  shifted  from  being  
regarded  as  unpleasant, odoriferous embodiments of an abject underclass to enterprising 
 citizens and targets of the contemporary development discourses of microcredit and 
sustainability. And their case involved a mobilization from below that borrowed elite 
expertise to make its mark. It could model football-fan activism supported by Greenpeace 
research and lobbying (not spectacle imposed from  above). 
When we ponder public uses of spectacle by organized vanguards in the name of a 
connection to the wider population, it is easy to fall into either a critical camp or a celebratory 
one. The critical camp would say that rationality must be appealed to in discussions of 
climate change, competition for emotion will ultimately fail, and grassroots ties are wildly 
imaginary or mechanistically cliché. Why? The silent majority does not like direct action; 
corporations outspend activists; such occasions preach to a light-skinned, middle-class 
eco-choir; media coverage is inevitably partial and hostile; and crucial decisions are made 
by elites, not in streets. This critique has particular resonance in   the case of events that 
are always already animated by spectacle, such as global sporting contests. 
Conversely, the celebratory camp would argue that a Cartesian distinction between 
hearts and minds is not sustainable; a sense of humor is crucial in order to avoid the image 
of environmentalists as ﬁnger-wagging scolds; corporate capital must be opposed in public; 
the media’s need for vibrant textuality can be twinned with serious discussion as a means 
of involving people who are not conventional activists; and a wave of anti-elite sentiment is 
cresting. The lugubrious hyper-rationality associated with environmentalism clearly needs 
leavening through sophisticated, entertaining, participatory spectacle. A blend of dark irony, 
sarcasm, and cartoonish stereotypes effectively mocks the Big Sport’s dalliance with Big Oil. 
But has the latter occurred? No. 
 
Alternative strategies 
There is little scholarly evidence that social-media environmental activism reaches beyond 
its dutiful chorines (Schäfer, 2012). This leaves us looking to engagement with sporting elites 
and fans, depend- ing on the case in hand, rather than focusing on a distant clickocracy that 
shows outrage on behalf of the Earth via credit-card activism or participates in centrally 
orchestrated campaigns. 
Despite the rhetoric, Big Green bureaucrats are very accustomed to sitting down far from 
their putative grassroots supporters in boardrooms and ofﬁces populated by corporate and 
public servants in order to discuss shared matters of concern. They know how to play dress-
up there just as well as when they put on blue-collar hats to disrupt blue-collar work. There 
is nothing wrong with this. If you do not talk to your opponents, you will not get your needs 
met. So chatting with the FIA, Formula 1, governments, and their sponsors should not feel 
odd. But Big Green is much less used to engaging football fans. 
Football supporters frequently draw on the discourse of citizenship to reject wholesale 
corporate control, as per the Football Supporters’ Federation and Supporters Direct, and 
even call for greener bootprints (http://www.fsf.org.uk; Keoghan, 2014; www.supporters-
direct.org; http://www.gareth- huwdavies.com/environment/environment_blog/newcastle-
united-football-club-top-of-the-green- league/). The US League of Fans’ Sports Manifesto 
notes today’s almost unbridled commodiﬁcation, as the newer media join their elderly and 
middle-aged counterparts in “a frenetic rush for money.” The League is concerned that 
this tendency diverts attention from the communality of sport—its capacity for cultural and 
civic expression and togetherness. One side effect is a lopsided relationship between 
spectatorship and participation: the media emphasize the former, notably sports in which 
they have ﬁnancial interests. The League calls for a focus on all sports stakeholders and 
building “citi- zenship through sports activism” (2011). We see similar tendencies in college 
sports fans’ attitudes to the environment (Casper, Pfahl, & McCullough, 2014). 
Football Supporters Europe works with major non-government organizations, including 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, FIFPro (the world players’ union), the 
International Trade Union Federation, and Terre des Hommes to construct systematic links 
between sporting bodies, the third sector, fans, and environmental concerns 
 (http://www.transparency.de/ﬁleadmin/pdfs/ 
Themen/Sport/MSE_Coalition_Letter_to_IOC_President_14-12-03.pdf; pers.comm). 
And even the much-derided football hooligans, akin in their media representation to 
ragpickers, might provide organic forms of environmentalism. Marx used “hooligan” and 
“rag picker” almost as synonyms to signify class-based abjection: 
[F]oul and adventures-seeking dregs of the bourgeoisie, … vagabonds, dismissed 
soldiers, discharged convicts, runaway galley slaves, sharpers, jugglers, lazzaroni, 
pickpockets, sleight-of-hand performers, gamblers, pro- curers, keepers of disorderly 
houses, porters, literati, organ grinders, rag pickers, scissors grinders, tinkers, beg- 
gars (Marx, 1987, p. 63) 
Several investigations of football “hooligans” reject both their romantic annunciation as 
working- class scions and their criminalization via moral panics (Armstrong & Young, 1997; 
Armstrong, 1998; Giulianotti, 1999, pp. 80–82; Schimmel, Harrington, & Bielby, 2007). 
Such work draws on EP Thompson’s (1971) insight that crowds may be animated by 
economic conditions, sexual   urges, or blind rages, but also by ideological commitments 
and desires to comment. 
Glancing at football fans, we might note the ultràs model of Southern-European play, 
with its connotations of carnival or hooliganism, depending on where you sit; the barras 
bravas of Argentina, with their spectacular arena conduct and its global intertexts for 
Spanish speakers; the uptake of Latin American chants on British terraces in the 1990s; 
and the 1999 Liverpool fans who paraded  a banner reading “Cosmopolitanismo Vaincra” 
[Cosmopolitanism Will Win]. Whilst these groups may be queried for their maleness and 
violence, they are signiﬁcant counters to the deracinated domain of corporatized sports—
an organic rejection of neoliberalism that forcefully re-localizes the global game. And 
consider the radical socialism associated with fans of Sankt Pauli FC of Ham- burg. German 
football more generally institutionalizes fan charters that form compacts between sup- 
porters and clubs. This example should be followed and enlivened environmentally with 
reference to pollution in local areas and the green credentials of teams (Galbiati, 2013; 
Montague, 2010; Totten, 2013). 
It could be argued that turning to fandom as a source of environmental activism is 
plutocratic— that it requires targeting consumers as activists in the very way that I have 
suggested excludes many citizens. But football fandom rides a complex border between 
commerce and culture in ways that are regularly invoked by participants, many of whom 
see their commitments as questions of lifelong identity rather than rational purchase and 
are opposed to seeing “their” teams as capitalist enterprises. 
 
Conclusion 
Like FIFA and Formula 1, corporations invoke citizenship ideals to describe themselves, 
while prin- cipally pursuing economic self-interest. This is part of a restless quest for proﬁt 
unfettered by regu- lation, twinned with a desire for moral legitimacy that is based on doing 
right while growing rich through a respect for law and a desire to meddle in everyday life. 
Greenwashing is their way of combining these goals. Attempts by Greenpeace to bring 
environmental agendas to bear on cars and balls through secondary -boycott style activism 
appear to have failed on their own terms and done nothing for greener sporting events. The 
specious social license to operate sails on. 
Thus far, there are few signs of hope in the area of Formula 1 fandom. Despite the fact 
that tele- vision ratings tumble, sponsors continue to sign up, because of the afﬂuent 
composition of the sport’s followers and its glamor. We have already noted that motor-
racing’s environmental tendencies derive from its sponsors, and that plus exerting state 
pressure seem advisable activities. Greenpeace should change tack and use its 
international entrée to inﬂuence those involved via research, stories in the press, policy 
activism, and boardroom critiques. 
Football is different. Although much of the sport is growing ever more corporate, real 
 resistance from fans is in evidence, and this is where Greenpeace needs to study fan 
interests and offer resources, follow the example of the Carbon Trust’s carbon bootprint 
research, promulgate such information through its clickocracy, and aid fans just as 
Colombian ragpickers were assisted by civil society. This would add to green citizenship at 
both elite and populist levels. 
Note 
1. It seems that Greenpeace’s public documents in support of the bid are no longer archived 
on its sites. Greenpeace criticized one car-company sponsor for failing to meet promises 
on ecological innovation (Kearins & Pavlovich, 2002). 
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